“我是谁”的断裂与确认：生命系统连续性何以成为主体同一性的存在论基础——兼论忒修斯之船、人格同一性与“我是谁”的分层回答

中文摘要

人格同一性问题长期围绕记忆、心理连续性与叙事身份展开，其核心追问在于：一个经历持续变化的存在，为何仍可被视为同一个“我”？本文认为，既有理论虽然揭示了自我确认的重要机制，却往往默认了一个未被充分反思的前提，即能够记忆、体验和反思的主体本身已经持续存在。通过对洛克、休谟、帕菲特等人格同一性理论的分析，以及对忒修斯之船、失忆、分裂等边界情境的考察，本文指出，同一性问题不能归结为单一标准的裁决，而应区分不同层级的连续性。在此基础上，本文提出“生命系统之我”的概念，认为持续自组织的生命过程构成心理连续性和主体确认的存在论基础。生命连续性并非与心理连续性并列的另一种标准，而是后者得以生成和维持的必要条件。由此，本文进一步重构自我的分层结构：生命系统构成基底，体感与行动形成主体与世界的原初关联，记忆、情感与理性生成精神主体，社会关系塑造具体身份。本文主张，自我确认并非自我存在的起点，而是生命系统在长期演化中形成的高级自我关系形式。通过这一重构，本文试图说明：“我是谁”的问题，不仅关乎谁在记得我，更关乎谁在维持那个能够记得、体验并反思自身的存在

Abstract

The problem of personal identity has long developed around memory, psychological continuity, and narrative identity, with its core question being: why can an entity undergoing constant change still be regarded as the same "I"? This paper argues that existing theories, though revealing important mechanisms of self-confirmation, often presuppose an insufficiently examined premise — that the subject who can remember, experience, and reflect has already been continuously existing. Through analyses of the personal-identity theories of Locke, Hume, and Parfit, and of boundary situations such as the Ship of Theseus, amnesia, and fission, the paper argues that the identity problem cannot be reduced to the verdict of a single criterion; rather, distinct levels of continuity must be distinguished. On this basis, the paper proposes the concept of the "self as living system," holding that the continuously self-organizing life process constitutes the ontological ground on which psychological continuity and subjective confirmation are generated and maintained. Life continuity is not another criterion parallel to psychological continuity, but the necessary condition for the latter's generation and maintenance. The paper further reconstructs a stratified structure of the self: the living system forms the base; bodily sensation and action forge the primordial connection between subject and world; memory, emotion, and reason generate the spiritual subject; and social relations shape concrete identity. The paper maintains that self-confirmation is not the starting point of self-existence but a higher-order form of self-relation formed by the living system through long evolution. Through this reconstruction, the paper attempts to show that the question "who am I" concerns not only who remembers me, but who maintains the being capable of remembering, experiencing, and reflecting on itself.

关键词：自我；人格同一性；生命系统；自创生；忒修斯之船；主体连续性；分层

Keywords: Self; personal identity; living system; autopoiesis; Ship of Theseus; subject continuity; stratification